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I. INTRODUCTION
Most people assume that, in the United States, the Executive branch of
state government is controlled by the state's Governor. That assumption is
not true in Florida. In Florida, the Governor shares executive power with
other elected executive branch officials, a group designated in the state
constitution as the Cabinet.' This "plural executive" form of organization
has been described as an institution "unique" to Florida.2 Is this system an
advance worth examination by other jurisdictions or is it a detour on the
road to good government that other jurisdictions have correctly ignored?
* Lawyer and legal educator. Chair of The Conference on the Florida Constitution, a
joint program of the Administrative Law Section and the Council of Sections of The Florida
Bar.
I. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4(a).
2. TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE
65 (1991). Allen Morris, a longtime observer and commentator on Florida government,
seems to concur with this assessment. "Since the Governor shares so much of the traditional
executive responsibility with members of an independent Cabinet, it is not surprising that
political scientists regard Florida's system of state government as different from virtually all
other states." ALLEN MORRIS, THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 1993-94 14 (24th Biennial ed.
1993). Some argue that Florida's Cabinet system is not that different from other states,
noting that attorneys general, treasurers and secretaries of state at the state level are
commonly elected. Fred 0. Dickinson, Jr., The Florida Cabinet, 43 FLA. B.J. 337, 339
(1969). However, the role that cabinet officers play in Florida government is significantly
different than the role played by similar officers in other states. Joseph W. Landers, Jr., The
Myth of the Cabinet System: The Need to Restructure Florida's Executive Branch, 19 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1103 (1992) ("No other state has an executive branch that even
resembles ours in Florida.").
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II. THE CABINET
The Florida Cabinet is part of the Executive branch, but it is not the
Governor's Cabinet. Its members are not appointed by the Governor and
they do not serve at the Governor's pleasure. Instead, members of the
Cabinet are elected independently of the Governor on the same statewide
ballot used to elect the Governor.' The Florida Constitution provides for
a Cabinet that consists of six members: a secretary of state, an attorney
general, a comptroller, a treasurer, a commissioner of agriculture and a
commissioner of education.4 The Florida Constitution and the Florida
Statutes prescribe the powers and responsibilities of these offices.5
Cabinet members discharge some of their powers and responsibilities
while acting individually; they discharge others while acting jointly with the
Governor and Cabinet; and they exercise still others while acting with other
cabinet officers. Where the constitution and statutes provide for a cabinet
member to oversee a particular agency of government, that responsibility is
discharged individually.6 Where the law provides for the Governor and
Cabinet to act together to manage an agency or to make certain decisions,
cabinet members have a different role. As joint decisionmakers, each acts
as a member of a collegial body chaired by the Governor. The Governor
is technically not a member of the Cabinet, even when acting with it.7
The legal formula for sharing power in this collegial body changes
depending on the type of question that the Governor and Cabinet must
decide.
Under this system, the governor has no control over the cabinet other
than that which comes from being the presiding officer, and, in most
cabinet decisions, it is possible for the governor to be outvoted on a
given issue. The governor is required to be in the majority for action
on certain issues under the provisions of the constitution (such as
clemency) or pursuant to statute (such as certain growth management
issues), thus giving the governor veto power on those issues even
3. FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4, 5.
4. Id. § 4.
5. See id.; FLA. STAT. §§ 16 - 19 (1993).
6. The constitution provides certain specified responsibilities for cabinet members, FLA.
CONST. art. IV, §§ 4, 5., and provides that the Legislature may place the administration of
departments within the Executive branch under the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the
Governor and Cabinet, a cabinet member, or an officer or board appointed by the Governor,
except where otherwise provided in the constitution. Id. § 6.
7. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 13.
[Vol. 181124
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though three cabinet members must join the governor for a decision.'
In some situations, cabinet members can act jointly without the
Governor. For example, confirmation by three members of the Cabinet can
be a substitute for senate approval of appointment to or removal from a
designated statutory office, if the statutes so provide. 9 Also, four cabinet
members may send the supreme court a written suggestion that the Governor
is incapable of serving as Governor.1"
The Governor is not required to share all executive power with the
Cabinet. One area where the Governor does not share executive power is
in the area of appointments. It has been estimated that the Governor makes
about 4,000 appointments over the course of a four year term." The
Governor also does not share the power to make the budget for Executive
branch agencies and to veto legislation.' In addition, the Governor is in
direct charge of state agencies that are not under the supervision of cabinet
officers or under the control of the Governor and Cabinet collegially. 3
III. THE DEBATE
Should the Florida Cabinet be abolished? People who care about the
organization of our state government tend to have strong feelings on this
subject. This is also a question that will likely confront the next Constitu-
tional Revision Commission when it convenes in a few years time. That
prediction is based on past history. The Cabinet was on the constitutional
revision agenda in 1968 and 1978. In the 1968 Constitution, the Cabinet
system was strengthened and given a clearer constitutional mandate. In
1978, the Constitutional Revision Commission recommended that the
8. D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 2, at 65.
9. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
10. Id. § 3(b).
11. MoRRis, supra note 2, at 12.
12. Id.
13. For a good discussion of which agencies are under whose control, see Landers, supra
note 2, at 1092-93. However, there has been some reorganization of the Executive branch
since that article was published, most notably the merger of the Department of Business
Regulation to form the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Ch. 93-220, §
2, 1993 Fla. Laws 1793, and the merger of the Department of Natural Resources and the
Department of Environmental Regulation to form the Department of Environmental
Protection. Ch. 93-213, 1993 Fla. Laws 2129, 2135-36 (amending FLA. STAT. § 370.017).
1994] 1125
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Cabinet be abolished, but that recommendation was rejected at the polls. 4
Would the abolition of the Cabinet be a welcome reform, or is the Florida
Cabinet a valuable resource that should be better appreciated?
A. The Origins of the Cabinet
The origins of the Cabinet have been traced back to the middle of the
last century.15
The first mention of Cabinet officers was in the 1868 Constitution, but
rather than being elected, they were appointed by the Governor and
confirmed by the senate. The 1885 Constitution eliminated the word
"Cabinet," but established six "administrative officers" who were to be
elected and who came to be known as the "Cabinet." In subsequent
years, the Legislature began vesting these Cabinet officers with addition-
al duties beyond those established in the Constitution, and began
establishing collective responsibilities. By 1968 the Governor and
Cabinet, in various combinations, served on thirty-five different boards
and commissions.'
6
The Cabinet system was strengthened in the 1968 Florida Constitution.
The new [1968] constitution not only retains the same six elective
Cabinet officials as the old constitution, but actually strengthens their
powers by providing a specific constitutional source for statutes creating
ex officio boards with the right to appoint officers, hire employees, fix
salaries, etc. By contrast to the 1885 Constitution, the Florida Constitu-
tion of 1968 nowhere refers to the Cabinet members merely as
"administrative officers," expands the legislative empowering clause
from ". . . perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law," to
"... exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be pre-
scribed by law," and specifically authorizes laws placing executive
departments under the supervision of the Governor and the Cabinet, or
[even] under a single Cabinet member.'7
14. MANNING J. DAUER, FLORIDA'S POLITICS & GOVERNMENT 97 (2d ed. 1986) (70%
of the voters rejected the proposal).
15. For a more complete discussion of the origins of the Florida Cabinet, see Ira W.
McCollum, Jr., The Florida Cabinet System-A CriticalAnalysis, 43 FLA. B. J. 156, 158-61
(1969) and Landers, supra note 2, at 1098-1100.
16. Landers, supra note 2, at 1099.
17. McCollum, supra note 15, at 166-67.
1126 [Vol. 18
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It is unclear whether the Cabinet will be in or out of favor when the next
round of constitutional revision begins.
B. The Arguments
The arguments for and against the cabinet system are not completely
unexpected. Those who support the cabinet system are likely to argue the
virtue of entrusting the work of the Executive branch to a number of
elected, and hence independently accountable, government officials, rather
than to the Governor and his or her appointed assistants. As expressed by
one former cabinet member:
The bad effects of the governor appointing system, rather than the
elected cabinet system, to oversee the executive branch must be
considered. Appointive bureaucracy is one of the great problems
continuing to mount on the American governmental scene. The power
of the ballot of Floridians in electing or rejecting those who seek
cabinet positions is the best possible guarantee for sound administration
because of the accountability of each cabinet officer to the people whom
he is privileged to serve."
At least in theory, elected officials have their credentials and performance
tested regularly at the ballot box, and, it is argued, a group of cabinet
members chosen in statewide elections could bring to the job a collective
wisdom, responsiveness and accountability uncharacteristic of appointed
officials. 9 The fact that there has historically been no limit on cabinet
members' terms has been advanced as a plus because they are able to
accumulate experience and provide continuity beyond that provided by the
Governor, who is limited to a maximum of two terms by the constitution.
20
Proponents also note that the cabinet system allows the government to
"spread the heat" of controversial decisions. 2'
18. Dickinson, supra note 2, at 339.
19. "One of the chief distinguishing features of the Cabinet is its ability to benefit from
the wisdom and experience of seven men instead of one on important, executive decisions.
This is the business-like board of directors' approach to sound executive decision making."
Id. at 338.
20. Id. The adoption of a constitutional amendment that places term limitations on
Florida officeholders promises to change this dynamic, but there has been very little
discussion of the effect of this change to date. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (eight year
limit).
21. Governor Fuller Warren said that "spreading the heat" may not be the most elegant
way to express it, but that this was one of the purposes of the cabinet system. MORRIS, supra
19941 1127
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Also, the system allows both Democrats and Republicans to participate
in the Executive branch at the same time. While this kind of power sharing
between political parties is common in the Legislative branch, it is quite
uncommon in the Executive branch. This feature is more significant now
that the two party system in Florida has become more vital. Although it
was once the exclusive domain of Democrats, the Cabinet today includes
four Democrats and two Republicans. Whether a multi-party Executive
branch is a benefit or a liability has not been the focus of much serious
study. It is also unclear how this new dynamic will effect the chances that
the Cabinet will be abolished during the constitutional revision. Since
neither party's control of the Governor's Office is certain, will both want to
leave open the possibility of participating in the Executive branch through
the cabinet system? Also, many cabinet members have come to the Cabinet
after serving as elected officials in the Legislative branch. Will the
Legislature oppose changes to the cabinet system to preserve their members'
opportunities to step up to statewide office after service in the Legislature?
In addition, proponents may contend that the cabinet system allows
potential candidates for governor or senator to develop and test their
statewide electoral support on the way to other statewide offices. Through
their decisions on issues before the Cabinet, cabinet members can develop
a track record on issues of statewide importance. Although cabinet
members have often aspired to other statewide offices in recent years,
surprisingly few have successfully used the Cabinet as a springboard to
other offices.2
Proponents are also likely to point to the openness of cabinet proceed-
ings as a significant virtue of the cabinet system.23 The proceedings are
open to public view and can provide ordinary people with a forum to
address the powerful on issues of statewide importance.
Cabinet day-usually a Tuesday-has come to serve as Florida's
note 2, at 14. One commentator critical of the cabinet system has suggested that it is better
characterized as "a way to escape the heat." Landers, supra note 2, at 1095.
22. For instance, one commentator has observed:
Since 1960, every Secretary of State except one has run for either Governor,
Lieutenant Governor or the United States Senate. Since the mid-sixties every
Attorney General has run for either Governor or the United States Senate. In
the last decade, the Treasurer has twice run for the United States Senate.
Interestingly, these attempts by Cabinet officers for political promotion have
almost never succeeded.
Landers, supra note 2, at 1100.
23. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 2, at 339.
1128 [Vol. 18
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"town meeting" with the public's business transacted with a greater
degree of openness than may be found in any other state government.
A meeting on Cabinet day affords the public an opportunity to
watch State government in operation. Because the Governor and the six
Cabinet officers are peers, each responsible basically to the electorate,
differences of opinion usually go unconcealed.24
The integration of this "town meeting" role of the cabinet system into the
more traditional administrative and judicial process is sometimes awk-
ward, 5 but the goal of providing a forum where politics, policy, and law
converge during the decisionmaking process seems worthwhile.
Opponents of the cabinet system are likely to see the fact that the
Cabinet is elected as a liability. They are likely to see the dynamics of the
cabinet system as encouraging political horsetrading and discouraging
principled decisionmaking, since an elected Commissioner of Education or
Insurance Commissioner, for example, might be tempted to trade votes on
issues that come before the Cabinet that are in areas far removed from their
area of primary concern in order to win support in the areas important to
them. This dynamic may reduce the validity of the proponents' accountabil-
ity argument as well, since the Insurance Commissioner and the Commis-
sioner of Education are unlikely to run on, or be called to task for, their
environmental record for example, even though as cabinet members they
cast many important votes on the environment. Also, opponents may argue
that specialists would be more capable administrators of the agencies than
cabinet officers or the Governor and Cabinet as a collegiate body, both
because specialists are likely to have more expertise than politicians and
because specialists would give their full attention to their one job and not
divide their time and attention, as the current system requires elected cabinet
officials to do. Proponents are likely to respond both that this analysis
undervalues the experience and wisdom of cabinet officials and overvalues
appointed officials, who are more likely to be chosen for their political
connections than for their expertise as administrators.
In addition, the cabinet system is criticized for dividing the executive
power of the state. Critics suggest that if the entire executive power of the
state was vested in the Governor, the Executive branch would become more
24. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 17.
25. See, e.g., Fox v. Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council, 442 So. 2d 221, 226
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (compromise plan adopted by Cabinet sitting as the Florida
Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission after hearing arguments "from parties as well as
comment by interested groups and individuals" remanded because not supported by evidence
in the record).
19941 1129
7
Maher: The Florida Cabinet: It it Time for Remodeling?
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
accountable.
Who is held responsible for what? The Governor is generally perceived
as the head of the executive branch of government although he has less
than total authority over that branch. The Governor is always at risk of
being blamed for failures caused by elements beyond his control.
On the other hand, the Governor, as well as Cabinet members, may
escape accountability for departments they collectively head. Candi-
dates for Cabinet offices run almost exclusively on issues concerning the
departments they will head, and that is generally the basis for their
election. z6
Opponents also argue that the cabinet system is inefficient. Not only
have the Governor and Cabinet been known to spend great amounts of time
on small matters,27 the Cabinet has developed a staff structure that places
yet another layer of bureaucracy over the operation of the departments that
must answer to the Governor and Cabinet. Cabinet aides' sessions "have
become virtual 'mini' Cabinet meetings that sometimes last longer than
actual cabinet meetings" according to one critic. 21
A collection of lawyers, lobbyists, opponents, and proponents plead
their causes at these meetings, which have become a virtual prerequisite
to appearing before the Governor and Cabinet the following week.
After the aides meet and before the Governor and Cabinet convene, the
aides brief their principals and recommend how they should vote.29
One summary of the opponents' complaints is that the cabinet system
in Florida "results in a weak executive branch, a lack of accountability, poor
management, wasted money, and is illogical . . . ."" It has been suggest-
ed that the various roles of the Governor, Cabinet, and of various cabinet
officers could be reorganized to place most of the Executive branch under
the control of the Governor, and that some of those changes would require
only statutory changes.3 '
26. Landers, supra note 2, at 1094-95.
27. Id. at 1096. One oft cited example of this is the hours that were once spent debating
the size that green turtles must reach before they could be taken. Id.; MORRIS, supra note
2, at 15.
28. Landers, supra note 2, at 1097.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1098.
3 1. See id. at 1100-02.
1130 [Vol. 18
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IV. CONCLUSION
The debate over the cabinet system in Florida is not a new debate. To
the extent that the debate is about the merits of election versus appointment,
the benefits of choosing government officials based upon their political
strengths versus their substantive expertise, it is an old debate that is now
being held in a new context. This debate has a familiar ring to it because
it is an argument that has echoed down so many corridors of American
government over so many years. This debate is repeated as our government
institutions are constantly organized and reorganized to respond to the
weaknesses in old systems and to help better prepare government to solve
new problems that seem increasingly more complex and intractable. As
Professor Bernard Shapiro explains:
From the founding of the republic, Americans have embraced two
opposing modes of public administration, the democratic and the
technocratic. The former, which we might term the Jacksonian
tradition, calls for government by the common people themselves, or at
least by administrators directly representative of and responsible to the
people . . . . The opposing, Federalist tradition, first advocated by
Hamilton, stresses the need for efficient government and thus the need
for an administration staffed not by an ever-changing stream of Know-
Nothings, but by experts.32
The recurring nature of this debate suggests that, while individuals may
adopt a position with great conviction, there are no "right" answers to
questions like: Which is better, election or appointment? If we are to arrive
at some consensus about which system is right for Florida, we must broaden
the debate.
More than the narrow arguments about which system makes decision-
makers more accountable, or more efficient, are necessary here. We must
recognize that even the word "accountability" may mean different things to
different people. Both sides in the debate argue their approach as to which
makes decisionmaking more accountable: the election of cabinet members
or the appointment of department heads by the Governor. One reason
behind the debate seems to be that they disagree about what accountability
means. What makes someone accountable; their formal accountability
through election, or their actual accountability as the system really operates?
Cabinet members are directly subject to reelection, but it is rare indeed that
32. Bernard Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487,
1495-96 (1983).
1994] 1131
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they are turned out of office, no matter what they have done. Department
heads are not elected, but they may either be fired by the Governor, whose
reelection is not assured and who is not permitted to stay in office more
than eight years, or they may be "fired" by the people themselves when the
Governor is rejected at the polls. If accountability means directly subject
to reelection, none of these other facts matter.
In discussing efficiency, we must not only argue about which
approach is more efficient, we must also consider the importance of
efficiency. This should be done both as a philosophical matter, that is, how
important is efficiency when balanced against competing interests, and it
should be done in context, that is within the totality of circumstances of
Florida government. Just because a system is inefficient does not mean it
should be abolished. For example, Florida has chosen to adopt an
Administrative Procedure Act that is relatively inefficient, when compared
with other state administrative procedure acts. This was a choice motivated
both by the Legislature's view of the context at the time our state Adminis-
trative Procedure Act was adopted, a view that state agencies could not be
trusted in their dealings with the public, and their political philosophy, a
belief that in the balance between efficiency, accuracy and acceptability, the
three normative requirements usually identified in administrative procedure,
efficiency was a minor concern. The result was a conscious decision to
make the Act less efficient but more protective of individual rights.3
To date, much emphasis has been placed on apparent weaknesses of the
cabinet system (e.g., that it divides executive power) and on the perceived
irrationality of some power sharing choices (e.g., why is one department
under a cabinet officer, another under the Cabinet and a third under the
Governor?), but that alone will probably not be enough to compel people to
change the system. People will want to know how well the cabinet system
is serving Floridians. The literature as it exists does not answer this
question. A complete answer necessarily requires a more explicit discussion
of both political philosophy and the larger context of the debate. Until that
discussion occurs, we may have difficulty deciding with confidence what
changes, if any, should be made to the cabinet system.
33. For a more complete discussion of these points see Stephen T. Maher, The Seventh
Administrative Law Conference Chairman's Introduction to the Symposium Issue, 18 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 607 (1991); Stephen T. Maher, We're No Angels: Rulemaking and Judicial
Review in Florida, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 767 (1991).
1132 [Vol. 18
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